This article analyses the merging of development and security in Western policies vis-à-vis "deficient" states in the global south, looking at the social life of anti-terror policies in Kenya. The attacks on September 11, 2001 renewed the interest in strong and stable states, leading many donors to focus on capacity building and security sector reform. In Kenya, the repressive use of these new powers by the Kibaki government has created significant resistance and the main external actors have taken the local opposition into account and have adapted their anti-terror agendas by complementing hard security assistance with soft interventions aiming at addressing local issues such as conflict prevention and development in communities perceived as being 'at risk' of harbouring terrorists. Representing a more general shift in security interventions in Africa, countering terrorism is now presented as part of a broader 'peace and security' agenda, but despite using new methods to engage with so-called crucial parts of the population, this is not a paradigm shift. Despite the different approaches and objectives, the various projects have ambiguous effects and donors have not abandoned the traditional rationality which privileges homeland protection over civil rights in the recipient country. 
the country's counterterrorism strategy -the US, the UK and Denmark-this article first contextualizes the recent counterterrorism engagement within the history of liberal development and security interventions in Africa, and then scrutinizes the evolution of counterterrorism programmes and their effects on the Kenyan state and society. While the projects of the US, the UK and Denmark differ both in motivation and practice, they all emphasize the importance of a broader 'peace and security' agenda. By complementing a genealogy of Western security discourse and practices towards Africa with grounded research on reactions and strategies of appropriation of current security-related policies in Kenya, the article highlights the positive synergies which can be generated by integrating an international relations perspective into area studies and allows for investigation of an oft-neglected but important nexus: How do Western interventions affect local societies and how are these interventions shaped and appropriated by local politics? 6 Through this approach the unclear effects of such projects can be comprehended in more detail and also put into global perspective. It shows how specific struggles within the donor-recipient relationship and micro-struggles can challenge and shape externally defined programmes, while a discoursetheoretical perspective accounts for shifts in how problems of international security are approached on a more structural level and how this, in turn, structures local politics.
The Kenyan case shows how relatively limited amounts of foreign assistance (as compared to what is spent in Afghanistan and Iraq) have significant political effects on the fabric of society. On the one hand, strategies concentrating on hard security assistance have enabled the government to expand its counterterrorism infrastructure, which in turn has been used for controversial security practices against sections of the population suspected to be prone to terrorist activities, namely the Muslim minority. On the other hand, these practices have http://www.hrw.org/en/category/topic/counterterrorism, http://www.amnesty.org/en/counter-terror-with-justice (2 January 2009). 6. The field research includes 40 semi-structured interviews with representatives of foreign countries (diplomats, development officials, members of the military), of Kenyan human rights organisations and Muslim organisations as well as politicians and lawyers and was conducted between October and December 2007 and August and September 2008 in Nairobi and Mombasa. mobilized opposition within Kenyan society and have also contributed to a rethinking of donor agendas where soft security and an engagement with civil society organizations are now accentuated. Even though stabilising states in the south to protect liberal order in the west resembles the rationality of cold war strategies, we argue that a significant change in the means of achieving this end has taken place. During the cold war, regime stability in the south was the exclusive goal and state institutions were the direct target of the superpowers. Today relevant communities are increasingly approached directly, as has become evident in new local participatory projects under the recent peace and security slogan. As part of this strategy, even foreign military actors engage in development work with local communities, making the boundaries between development and security assistance harder to identify. Despite such differences in approach and objective, however, we argue that the projects have yet to abandon the traditional rationality according to which Western development and security interventions in 'deficient' states serve homeland protection and thus continue to prioritize stability over civil rights.
Liberal interventionism in deficient states
While in the middle of the 1990s deficient statehood was discussed as a root cause of internal conflict and a concern for international conflict prevention efforts, since 2001 it is increasingly considered to provide a breeding ground for terrorism. conditionalities. But while structural adjustment programmes aimed at downsizing the state and at strengthening market forces, academic narratives increasingly discussed institutional corruption, neopatrimonialism, and state decay. 12 The pendulum swung back in the middle of the 1990s when market reform was complemented with state capacity-building to counter instability and thus the crisis of governance to which the downsizing of states had contributed.
Yet the economic and political conditionality of aid and a concern with aid effectiveness continued the practice of selectively cooperating with 'good performers', but excluding 'poorly performing countries'.
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It was complex emergencies in some of these countries in the 1990s that made them an important security concern for Western states. government, continue to benefit from bilateral programmes of military support and security sector reform. 20 Development assistance has also been reframed over the last decade, and now particularly addresses 'difficult partnership countries' and 'low income countries under stress' (LICUS).
Countries that had earlier been sidelined in development assistance receive unprecedented attention to check 'the proclivity of LICUS to become failed states and terrorist havens'. 21 In addition, traditional development aid has been supplemented by soft security policies that target particular parts of the population such as the Kenyan Muslim minority. Fighting terrorism is presented as a function of peace and security and propagates a new role not only for foreign militaries, but also for the local population. 22 This integration of development assistance into security policies raises a number of serious concerns. In the next section we turn to how this new approach has come about and how it plays out on the ground in Kenya.
Kenya: Donor strategies between development and countering terrorism
Although Kenya seems far away from the primary targets of current Western anti-terror interventions, it is perceived as a central strategic ally in the US counterterrorism efforts and one of several developing countries designated as 'anchor states' for regional stability. states, supplemented by a democratization agenda. 27 Compared to the UK and Denmark, US programmes are also more clearly driven by homeland security concerns and the development agency USAID has relatively little influence on these imperatives.
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The anti-terrorism agenda is an important part of the Kenya policy of these donors. Each of them is involved in one or more of the following strategies: (1) granting hard security assistance to state security forces, (2) providing legal advice on anti-terrorism legislation, and (3) engaging with crucial parts of the population on soft security issues. The case of Kenya shows how combining these strategies inevitably produce incessant contradictions. This strategy is applied by the joint UNDP/UNODC-facilitated project 'Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Capacity for a Safer Kenya' and is funded by the Danish government.
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The core objective of the project was the passing of an anti-terrorism bill.
The third strategy concentrates on soft security and assumes a close relationship between poverty and terrorism. a role in countering terrorism, including assistance for Kenya's security sector, cooperation with the judiciary as well as projects targeting civil society organisations.
Using the anti-terrorism infrastructure: recent state security practices in Kenya
External policy blueprints and anti-terror programmes were met by different interests and resentments at the local level, by the Kenyan government and civil society and also by local staff in the embassies in Nairobi. Beth Whitaker calls the Kenyan government's relationship with the US on counterterrorism a 'reluctant partnership' in which the Kenyan government often criticizes US foreign policy publicly but cooperates behind the scene. 40 In the following section we discuss the various practices this 'partnership' has allowed for, and show their effects on the Kenyan society as well as reactions by local agents in civil societies and donor embassies.
One of the most controversial issues has been the effort to introduce an anti-terrorism bill which proved to be more than a mere legal affair. 41 In fact, the debate on the Suppression of Security to declare by decree an organization terrorist and the fact that being associated with a declared terrorist organization constitutes a crime have been questioned. 43 However, the clause that raised the most anger was the provision that a person may be arrested without a warrant 'who, in a public place wears an item of clothing […] in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist organisation'. 44 The Muslim community feared that members might be arrested on the mere basis of their appearance as Muslim. After fierce opposition from parts of the public and key members of the parliament, the bill was withdrawn. A second draft, introduced in 2006, was also withdrawn despite pressure from abroad and internal interests to implement it. 45 In the end the government recognized that it could not get a majority vote.
However, some of its discriminatory provisions were nevertheless carried out in practice by the state security forces, even though the law had not been enacted. 46 Substantial criticism has been levelled at the Kenyan authorities, especially the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) due to its random actions and its lack of accountability. 47 In the words of one human rights activist:
The rationale of setting up and disbanding special units in this country seems to be about personal gains. They ask: What's in for us? As for the ATPU you can bribe your way out. The 'war on terrorism' provided a lot of goodies for the Kenyan security sector from outside: hardware, training, assistance. The police became quite enthusiastic about those things. To a certain extent ATPU is an amorphous institution, filled with secrecy and corruption. It is well known that in many African countries security institutions are more often than elsewhere an instrument for strengthening personal rule and are characterized by a culture of secrecy and impunity. Current donor policies may strengthen this propensity. 54 At the very least, the practices by Kenyan security institutions raise serious doubts about the priority given by international donors to strengthening state security sectors without a simultaneously strong focus on accountability and transparency.
Engaging communities in the "war on terror"
Although In this way, the counterterrorism of the years immediately after September 11 has been reframed into a 'peace and security' agenda that also includes a development element.
However, while welcoming the donors' reorientation on how to counter terrorism, some groups remain cautious as to the donors' objectives.
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In order to get a clearer picture of how the current security regime materializes and is being challenged or reinforced on the ground, it is crucial to look at agency both within foreign embassies and at the level of the organizations and communities amongst the recipients. protest against security practices in Kenya has had an impact on the re-modelling of some of the counterterrorism projects in this field, although clear results of those projects have yet to materialize.
The Danish bilateral project on counter-terrorism activities in Kenya was initiated by
Copenhagen as part of the ambition to align development assistance and the fight against terrorism. At the same time, however, the Danish embassy in Nairobi was able to actively participate in designing the bilateral project on the ground. While trying to identify possible non-state partners, the fact finding mission was not only confronted with the question of whether the project should work exclusively with Muslim groups, but also by opposition from
Muslim organizations who were reluctant to cooperate with Western donors under the label of counterterrorism. 59 Following these conflicts, the project was renamed 'peace, security and development' and now operates as a budget support to five local organizations (including Muslim, inter-faith and non-religious groups) working on a wide variety of issues including conflict prevention, inter-religious mediations, human rights trainings, local peace meetings, and youth empowerment. 60 The local partner institutions themselves praise the autonomy the Danish embassy allows them in pursuing their own activities rather than following predesigned counterterrorism projects. The reformulation is celebrated as a victory by the partner organizations -interpreted as a proof that local NGOs have the space to determine the donors' objectives and strategies. At the same time, increasing donor interest in this field allows local groups to jump on the "peace and security" bandwagon and collect the resources provided, which may have divisive effects as it affects intra-communal power relations. 61 Despite the move towards engaging with local populations, addressing small-scale development, everyday crime and conflict resolution rather than focussing narrowly on The US government officially justifies the increased engagement of the army in local social development with the better resources and in-house capacity for infrastructure projects of the Pentagon. 65 Yet, a study by the military academy at West Point emphasises three strategic benefits in shifting the assistance from military operations to economic development in Kenya's Coastal area:
First, it will increase intelligence on terrorist activities. Second, it will decrease the political costs Kenyan politicians pay for supporting U.S. counterterrorism priorities, and so increase their level of cooperation. Third, increased economic aid raises the cost to terrorists of providing social services as a buy-in mechanism for their larger goals. 66 Despite their differences in approach and activities the projects discussed above are the result of the Western concerns for homeland security. From a socio-economic perspective, a concern for local economic development and crime prevention in Kenya's coast province may be fully justifiable, but the more they are linked with the military and intelligence, the more likely they are to be met with resistance from local groups and this is why these initiatives often have ambiguous effects. In the case of more civilian projects such as the Danish and the British schemes, long-term local development objectives have to be weighed against rather short-term security objectives. In turn, in cases where such programmes are appropriated by local actors for their own interests, the projects' potential side effects such as shifting local power relations or aid dependency call for further empirical analysis. 67 
Conclusion
Our analysis of recent liberal interventionism and of counterterrorism in Kenya shows how addressing risks to "homeland security" perceived to emanate from deficient states in Africa has further merged Western security and development policies. It demonstrates that current external state-building and the empowerment of state security institutions are appropriated for illiberal purposes. Demonstrating their adaptability to national and international dynamics such as strong local criticism of the state-centred counterterrorism policies, strengthening the security capacities of the Kenyan state through counterterrorism assistance has thus been complemented with an engagement with local groups in Muslim-dominated regions under the new label of peace and security. This label now spans projects involving counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, conflict prevention, and local welfare projects. As the history of merging development and security interventions points to the ambiguous motivations and effects of such policies, a closer scrutiny of the manifestations of the donors' new agenda is needed.
Contrary to perceptions of a monolithic securitized discourse, in Kenya local agents have had the ability to modify pre-designed agendas for these new developmental security projects.
Many Muslim communities in the Coast region in Kenya, for instance, embrace the focus on everyday crime and socio-economic issues. However, our analysis has shown that if such an approach remains exclusively guided by the logic of combating risks to (Western) security abroad, it may produce unintended consequences. counterinsurgency, and with the use of potentially emancipative development projects as new modes of governing populations.
